Prochaine séance du séminaire Réalisme: Charles Travis (28 nov. 2015)
Salle Lalande 10h30-12h30
(Université de Porto)
April in Pittsburgh: All About Wirklichkeit
Philosophy over the last century (and a bit more) has been marked by a divide between two different conceptions of truth, and consequently of representation (that is, of representing something as something). Notables on one side of the divide include Tractarian Wittgenstein, Strawson, McDowell and Hornsby. On the other side we find Frege, Austin and (notable or not) me. From a Fregean perspective, what distances the other side of the divide from his is, above all else, neglect of the distinction between the general and the particular. The other side of the divide is deeply impressed by the idea that, as it might be put, truth is an identity under predication—an apparent truism, stressed by Frege himself, but, if Frege is right, misapplied on the far side of this divide. Superficial features of contemporary philosophy may make it seem strange to cast Frege and Austin, of all people, as bedfellows. As in some ways they are not. But there is a misunderstanding here. In fact, Frege, though he might well not have endorsed all that Austin says, in fact laid the groundwork for saying it (while making sense). All of which, finally, raises questions as to what (a) realism might be about.