Prochaine séance du séminaire Phénoménologie et idéalisme transcendantal (11 juin 2022)

Dernière séance : samedi 11 juin 2022, 13h30-16h30

Salle Halbwachs (escalier C, 1er étage droite, 17 rue de la Sorbonne, 75005 Paris)

 

Pour assister au séminaire en présentiel, merci de vous inscrire via le lien suivant, avant le vendredi 10 juin :

https://evento.renater.fr/survey/seminaire-de-doctorants-et-de-jeunes-chercheurs-en-phenomenologie-derniere-seance-l63oalme

Pour suivre le séminaire à distance via Zoom, merci de vous inscrire à l’adresse mail suivante :

doctorants.phenomenologie@gmail.com

 

 

Présentations de :

Giulio Marchegiani (Bergische Universität Wuppertal)

“Towards a Non-Dogmatic Conception of Objectuality. The Transcendental Turn as a Faithful Development of Husserl’s Doctrine of Truth and Intentionality”

Bence Marosan (Budapest Business School)

“The Impact of Transcendental Turn of Husserl’s Early Notion of Metaphysics and his Peculiar Argument for the Existence of God”

John MacDonald (Brock University)

“A Heideggerian Phenomenological Approach To Kant”

Résumés des présentations :

 

Giulio Marchegiani (Bergische Universität Wuppertal)

“Towards a Non-Dogmatic Conception of Objectuality. The Transcendental Turn as a Faithful Development of Husserl’s Doctrine of Truth and Intentionality”

This contribution aims to support the thesis that the transcendental phase of Husserl’s phenomenology, with the notions of reduction and noema at its centre, does not represent a subjectivistic turn from the realist approach of the Logical Investigations. The intention is to show that the latter, if it is not to be understood in the sense of a metaphysical or naturalistic dogmatism, leads Husserl in the Logical Investigations to approach the problem of truth and objective knowledge in a way in which the transcendental turn of the Ideas represents a coherent development. The theory of truth developed in the Sixth Logical Investigation, based on the investigation of the structure of intentional acts, shows in fact that in objective knowledge one is not dealing with objectivity as being in itself, but with the sense contents of intentional acts, and that objectivity cannot therefore be separated from its mode of givenness. This already prefigures the fundamental gesture of transcendental phenomenology, namely the primacy of the dimension of sense over that of being, which transcendental reduction and the notion of the noema only radicalise. The conditions of the constitution of objective being are thus to be sought in the domain of the noematic sense, where it only appears as the invariant pole of a multiplicity of constitutive acts from which it cannot be separated in order to be posited as independent. Precisely in order to account for the objectivity of the real in a manner that conforms to a genuine critical philosophy, phenomenology must therefore lead the question of the conditions of possibility of the real back to the constitutive dynamic, which has nothing to do with naive stances on realism and idealism, because it is the source of every constitution of being, whether subjective or objective.

 

Bence Marosan (Budapest Business School)

“The Impact of Transcendental Turn of Husserl’s Early Notion of Metaphysics and his Peculiar Argument for the Existence of God”

The problem of metaphysics counted as a crucial field for Husserl throughout his entire philosophical career, both as the ultimate science of reality and the discipline of the “highest and ultimate questions” (cf. e.g. Trizio 2019). In my presentation I would like to show, how Husserl’s “transcendental turn” around 1906/07 influenced his metaphysical ambitions. It helped him in a crucial manner to articulate a phenomenologically grounded metaphysics, and in particular it made him possible to elaborate a phenomenologically articulated notion of God. This conception implied a peculiar proof of the existence of God in Husserl, which was never explicitly developed by him, but whose main steps could be clearly found in his writings. The most important elements of this argument could be found in texts that stemmed between 1906 and 1914. The main focus of my presentation will be to reconstruct this argument.

A fundamental feature of his transcendental idealism, that enabled him to create a phenomenologically rearticulated notion of God, was the supposed strong metaphysical connection between consciousness and Being. The cornerstone of this argument is Husserl’s conception according to which “the idea of an actually existing thing prescribes that there should be an actually experiencing consciousness too” (Husserl 2003, p. 77). The next main step of this argument is that the intentional structure of constituting consciousness refers to an infinite horizon of phenomena, in the end, to an actually infinite phenomenal world. The third important part is that – in Husserl’s opinion – the transcendental consciousness could unfold in an objective manner an infinite number of axiological potentialities and realities in the world, which are increasing in their perfection and refers to the ideal of ultimate excellence. The final step is Husserl’s claim, according to which we need an actually infinite mind (God) as a guarantee that the infinite reality – with its axiological aspect – could be constituted and conceived in a coherent and unitary way through the finite forms of subjectivity.

 

John MacDonald (Brock University)

“A Heideggerian Phenomenological Approach To Kant”

Let us consider Kant’s philosophy of Will, which is not what we usually mean by Will, but rather unconsciously self-legislating rules that make scientific experience/judgments possible, as well as moral experience/judgments possible.  This is Kant’s philosophy of 2 kinds of causality: natural causality, and causality of freedom.  Kant says his critical period was sparked by Hume’s skepticism.  For instance, Hume said we only ever experience an ever-changing manifold of thing following upon thing (one ball hits and moves another) or state following upon state (steam following upon heating liquid water).  We simply experience a constantly changing manifold: this, then this, then this, etc, not B following A necessarily, that is, according to a rule.  Therefore, for Hume we don’t experience cause and effect, just the mind associates A with B as cause and effect because we see them together all the time.

Regarding natural causality, Kant agreed, but then made a distinction between sense and experience, saying that while we only ever sense a manifold of thing following upon thing or state following upon state, the mind re-presents this manifold from sense to itself as “understanding experience,” and so we understandingly experience cause and effect as the manifold presented in sense re-presented in something like the form of a language, re-presented to us in terms of the framework of the rule of temporal irreversibility of the varying degrees of the experienced causal sequence: So, we (linguistically) experience temporal irreversibility (1) Positively as change of place where form is unchanged  (one ball hits another and moves it); (2) Comparatively Greater as temporary change of form (boiling water, that then returns to starting form when the heat source is removed); and (3) Superlatively creating a self-standing new form (the cooked egg can’t be uncooked).  We do indeed understandingly experience the various degrees of the irreversibility of the causal sequence even if we don’t sense it.  For Kant, obviously Hume was right that we don’t “sense” the “according to a rule,” but do “understandingly experience” it.  In order to make sense of this, Kant had to invoke a third faculty that is not simply sense or understanding, but rather the faculty of the imagination, because cause and effect isn’t experienced arbitrary, but is read off of certain processes, like the stretching out of time in reading the boring book (Langeweile) isn’t simply unrelated to the book, even though the next person need not experience the stretching of time in reading the book at all.  Causality and time are not purely perceiving (intentio), or perceived (intentum) according to Heidegger, but in the middle.

Regarding the other kind of causality, causality of freedom, Heidegger says in his lecture course on Kant’s practical philosophy that Kant redefines Descartes “I Think” as “I Will,” in that through the unconscious self-legislation of rules the Will re-presents the world and self to itself out of a causality of freedom (man being founded on himself), which Heidegger says is not a freedom-from, but a freedom-for that “makes possible”:  So, man unconsciously legislates to himself that he must morally accompany all his actions, in turn making moral judgments/moral experiences possible, which can be phenomenalized in contrast to certain mentally challenged people, or animals, who are not attached to their actions morally in the way we are (the dog isn’t evil because he bites you).  This follows from reason, since someone with the intellect of a 2 year old can’t be moral or immoral.  Schelling said our capacity for evil defines us as a species because only intelligent humans can sink below other animals in depravity.  Similarly, as I said, the way man re-presents the sensory manifold to himself in understanding experience makes scientific causal experience and causal judgments possible.
Man unconsciously obeys these self imposed rules/imperatives categorically, which is to say as a function of being human.  For Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, the key takeaway is there is a non-temporal causality of freedom that the Will self-legislates whereby I morally accompany all my action, making moral judgments and experiences possible (unlike with  some mentally challenged people and lower animals with the intelligence of 2 year olds), so even though natural cause and effect deals with causality in space and time, the category of Causality (as causality of freedom shows) itself is separate from time, and so is a category of the understanding.

 

 

 


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